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Evolving UK policy on diversity in the armed services: 
multiculturalism and its discontents 
 
Professor David Mason, Nottingham Trent University, UK 
Professor Christopher Dandeker, King’s College, London, UK 
 
Abstract 
 
Reflecting a generally multiculturalist rhetoric, UK policy in this area has 
hitherto focussed on enhancing the degree to which the armed services 
represent or reflect the ethnic makeup of the UK population. Ambitious 
targets have been set and some progress made in moving towards them. 
However, the dynamics of population change, together with the diverse 
preferences of ethno-religious minorities, have meant that the goal of 
representativeness has remained out of reach. At the same time, the 
armed services have continued to struggle with an ongoing recruitment 
problem while the volume of operational commitments has shown little 
sign of reducing. 
 
The authors have previously argued that the heritage of empire has been 
a key background factor, from the perspective both of the armed services 
and of potential minority ethnic recruits. Since 11 September, 2001, a 
further series of complicating circumstances has entered the arena. The 
‘war on terror’ has generated a clear sense of marginalisation among some 
of Britain’s Muslim minorities, while the participation of British-born 
Muslims in the 2 July, 2005 attacks in London has raised new questions 
about the relationship between formal citizenship, identity, rights and 
duties. It has also led to the very principle of multiculturalism, long 
challenged by both the white right and black nationalists, being 
increasingly questioned across the political spectrum. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper draws on and develops the ideas presented in the authors’ previous 
published contributions to the discussion of the United Kingdom Government’s 
evolving policy on the recruitment of minority ethnic groups to the armed services 
(Dandeker & Mason, 2001; 2003; 2007). This policy, aimed at addressing the 
apparent under-representation of Britain’s citizens of minority ethnic descent when 
compared with their presence in the population as a whole, has its origins in the 
1998 Strategic Defence Review White Paper (SDR) (MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 1998), 
which for the first time set targets for the recruitment of minority ethnic personnel. 
 
In this paper, we revisit our analysis of the arguments that underpinned the SDR 
commitments and consider what progress has been made in meeting the targets 
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set. In seeking to identify outstanding issues and emergent problems, we draw 
attention to continuing inconsistencies in wider Government policy towards 
nationality and citizenship which reflect the persistent societal uncertainties of an 
ex-colonial power.  
 
2. Arguments for equity: fairness, citizenship and effectiveness 
As we have noted elsewhere (Dandeker & Mason, 2001), equal opportunities 
measures are characteristically justified in terms of two kinds of arguments: those 
that appeal to fairness and citizenship and those that appeal to self-interest. Both 
resonate with themes in SDR and have been implicated in the armed forces re-
examination of a range of traditional practices and assumptions.  
 
In addition, both EU and domestic law increasingly constrain the context in which 
the armed services must operate. In particular, the Race Relations Amendment 
Act (2000), together with subsequent statutory regulations, has placed a duty on 
all public bodies to take positive steps not only to eliminate discrimination but 
also to promote racial equality. 
 
SDR, for the first time, set out targets for the recruitment of minority ethnic 
personnel, with a commitment to ensuring that ‘the composition of our Armed 
Forces reflects that of the population as a whole.’ (MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 1998: 
Supporting Essay 9, para. 41) 
 
41. Ethnic Minorities. We are determined that the Armed Forces should 
better reflect the ethnic composition of the British population. Currently 
some 6% of the general population are from ethnic minority backgrounds, 
but they make up just 1% of the Services. This must not continue. We 
have set a goal of attracting 2% of new recruits this year from ethnic 
minority communities for each Service. We want that goal to increase by 
P
s -Print
3 
 
1% each year so that, eventually, the composition of our Armed Forces 
reflects that of the population as a whole.1 
 
These targets were underpinned by the two kinds of arguments referred to 
above: first, that proportional representation is a worthy goal in its own right 
since issues of fairness and citizenship are at stake; and second, that there is a 
‘business case’, itself with several dimensions. 
 
Probably the most pressing of the business case drivers has been the continuing 
and chronic problem of under-recruitment.2 Meeting the targets enshrined in SDR 
and subsequent policy pronouncements would, it has been argued, secure access 
to a wider recruitment pool as the armed services compete with civilian 
companies for scarce labour both in terms of quantity and quality. In this context, 
we can point to the fact that minority ethnic groups, although comprising 7.9 per 
cent of the population of the United Kingdom and 9.0 per cent of the population 
of England at the time of the 2001 Census, constitute a much larger proportion of 
the younger age groups most relevant to current and future military recruitment. 
Thus the Mixed group had the youngest age structure, with 50 per cent under the 
age of 16. Thirty-eight per cent of both the Bangladeshi and Other Black groups 
were aged under 16, and 35 per cent of Pakistanis also fell into this age group. 
This was almost double the proportion of the White British group where one in 
five (20 per cent) were under the age of 16 (National Statistics, 2004). These 
data also need to be set against wider evidence of a generally ageing population.  
 
Paradoxically, however, these data also cast doubts on the targets for 
representation established by Government. From an equity perspective, it is 
widely accepted among equal opportunity professionals that the relevant 
recruitment target for any occupation should be the proportion of minority ethnic 
persons in the relevant recruitment pool. As these data show, that proportion is 
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significantly higher than the current target of 8% minority representation by 2013 
(see note 1). 
 
Other business case arguments include the claim that contemporary demands on 
the armed services, including enhanced peacekeeping and peace-enforcing roles, 
place a premium on more intelligent, flexible and diverse service personnel able 
to contribute to an ever wider range of challenges. With educated and qualified 
personnel increasingly at a premium, the higher levels of post-16 educational 
participation among members of some minority ethnic populations are said to 
provide the Services with a useful additional pool of skilled labour.  
 
3.  Progress towards the target of representativeness? 
Despite the persuasiveness of these arguments, at least to military policy makers, 
progress in increasing the recruitment and retention of members of minority ethnic 
groups has been painfully slow. The targets set by the SDR, and subsequently 
modestly revised, have proved difficult to attain, even with the aid of what might be 
seen as some creative accounting.  
 
Following disappointing results in the early years, more recent data do appear to 
show the policy first enunciated in the SDR beginning to pay dividends, with 
evidence of greater success in recruiting minority ethnic personnel in the most 
recent years for which data are available. On the face of it, the figures are beginning 
to approach the government’s targets and to edge closer to the proportion of the 
population recorded by the 2001 Census as of minority ethnic origin, although we 
should be mindful of the earlier discussion of the age distributions of different 
communities. 
 
Table 1 contains data relating to recruitment and shows a broadly upward trend, at 
least to the end of financial year 2005/06. As a result of this improvement, a 
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Ministry of Defence press release (23 February, 2006) was able to claim: 
The percentage of UK Regular Forces from ethnic minority backgrounds 
continues to rise; at 1 January 2006 ethnic minorities accounted for 5.5 
percent compared to 5.2 percent at 1 January 2005. The largest increase 
was in the Army, where ethnic minorities comprised about 8 percent of 
regular forces by mid-2006 (Ministry of Defence, 2006).  
Table 1 
 
Minority Intake to Untrained Strength of UK Regular forces by Service 
(percentages, excluding unknown) 
 
 1998 
/09 
1999 
/00 
2000 
/01 
2001 
/02 
2002 
/03 
2003 
/04 
2004 
/05 
2005 
/06 
2006 
/07 
All 
personnel 
1.8 1.7 2.9 * 6.7 7.3 6.7 5.5 * 
          
Officers 1.9 1.3 2.1 * 2.9 2.3 2.6 2.4 * 
Naval 
Service 
1.2 1.3 2.1 * 1.7 0.3 1.6 2.0 * 
Army 1.5 0.6 1.5 * 2.9 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.6p 
Royal Air 
Force 
3.1 2.9 2.9 * 4.6 2.1 2.8 1.7 * 
          
Other 
ranks 
1.8 1.8 2.9 * 6.9 7.7 7.1 5.8 7.2p 
Naval 
Service 
1.6 1.4 1.9 * 3.3 3.8 3.5 3.9 4.2 
Army 2.0 2.0 3.6 * 9.2 10.2 8.9 6.7 8.2p 
Royal Air 
Force 
1.2 1.2 1.7 * 2.2 1.6 2.3 1.8 1.5 
Source: Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA)3 
 
* Data unavailable 
p  Provisional 
 
Despite this evidence of progress, however, it is necessary to enter some important 
caveats. The first is that despite an upward trend since the publication of the SDR, 
there remains a gap between the proportions of minority ethnic military personnel 
and the representation of the relevant groups in the population at large. This gap is 
widened further when differential age structures are taken into account. Moreover, 
latest figures suggest a possible fall-off in recruitment from a peak in 2003/04.4 
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Closer inspection of the data also suggests that there may have been a spurt in 
recruitment of minority ethnic personnel between 2002 and 2005 which may not 
necessarily be sustained.5  
 
Second, there are important differences between service arms as well as between 
officer and other ranks recruitment. Greatest progress seems to have been made in 
the army, which is also home to the largest numbers of minority ethnic personnel, 
whilst naval service and RAF recruitment still lag behind target. Both the total 
numbers and the percentage of minority ethnic personnel entering the officer corps 
remain very low. 
 
A third caveat concerns the conceptualization of ‘minority ethnic’. As we have noted 
elsewhere (Dandeker & Mason, 2003), this gross category takes no account of the 
different socio-demographic profiles, levels of social mobility, educational attainment 
and cultural traditions of the very diverse groups which make up Britain’s minority 
ethnic population. As a result, it is entirely conceivable that the gross target of 
increasing minority ethnic representation to a level commensurate with the 
proportion of the population classified as ‘ethnic minority’ could be reached without 
representativeness being achieved for some of the communities involved.6 It is 
arguable that the progress that has been made in closing the gap in relation to 
recruitment targets exemplifies this problem, since the recruitment of indigenous 
minorities is significantly skewed towards those classified as ‘Black’ – i.e., of 
Caribbean (and ultimately African) descent, including many with ‘mixed’ heritage. 
South Asian descended personnel remain under-represented in the armed services 
to the point of near-invisibility. 
 
A further, serious conceptual and practical complication is that many of those 
classified as ‘ethnic minority’ are, in fact, Commonwealth citizens. Thus, although 
they are excluded from the figures presented in Table 1, we should note that Fijians, 
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Vincencians and St Lucians, recruited en bloc to the Army, represented more than 
one third of those recorded as ethnic minority recruited in 2002/03. (This figure was 
itself down from half in the two previous years for which figures are available.) To 
this must be added Commonwealth citizens recruited individually in the UK (and 
who are included in the data in Table 1). This means that, despite evidence of more 
success in recruiting ethnic minorities, a substantial proportion of ‘minority ethnic’ 
personnel (approximately 60 per cent in the case of the army) are, in fact, 
Commonwealth and other non-UK citizens rather than British citizens. Indeed, there 
is some evidence that the apparently improved recruitment of minority ethnic 
personnel coincided with a conscious decision by the Ministry of Defence to target 
commonwealth citizens to meet recruitment shortfalls. 
 
This distinction is important in the context of the history of differential and 
conditional incorporation during the imperial phase of Britain’s past, not least 
because Commonwealth citizens are not British Citizens and are thus not entitled to 
the full suite of citizenship rights available to British Citizens. This in turn raises 
three questions: Does increasing diversity by these means really fulfil the spirit of 
the SDR commitments? What implications does non-citizen status have for 
incorporation on equal terms within the military team? What, if any, are the 
implications for operational effectiveness? 
 
The non-British component of the Army, in particular, is very significant, 
representing nearly two thirds of serving minority ethnic personnel at 1 January, 
2007, with 56 nationalities represented. By late 2005, concerns about the 
dependence of the army on foreign nationals were sufficiently strong for the matter 
to reach the attention of the press, for active recruitment of Commonwealth and 
foreign personnel to cease and for suggestions to begin to emerge from military and 
other sources that a limit be placed on the proportion of non-British army personnel. 
The Times reported the matter under the headline, ‘How British Army is fast 
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becoming foreign legion’:  
 
THE Army has stopped actively recruiting Commonwealth and foreign 
soldiers because the numbers joining up have risen by nearly 3,000 per cent 
in seven years. …  
 
However, in recent years, many regiments would not have survived without 
the influx of recruits from the Commonwealth, particularly from Fiji, Jamaica, 
South Africa and Ghana, because of drastic manpower shortages. Soldiers 
from overseas now account for 6 per cent of the Army’s strength, rising to 9 
per cent if the 3,000 Gurkhas recruited from Nepal are taken into account.  
 
Last year the 1st Battalion The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment had 116 
overseas and Commonwealth citizens serving in its ranks, representing 
about 20 per cent of the total strength. The Black Watch had 31 
Commonwealth soldiers, most of them Fijian.  
 
The overseas recruits are regarded as high-quality soldiers who have played 
an increasingly important role in operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Many have won gallantry medals: Private Johnson Beharry, 25, who was 
awarded the Victoria Cross for saving the lives of his comrades in Iraq in 
2003, was born in Grenada and was one of the 116 Commonwealth soldiers 
who joined the 1st Battalion The Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment.  
The problem for army chiefs is that the number of applicants from the 
Commonwealth has risen dramatically at the same time as recruits from 
within the United Kingdom have dropped significantly. General Sir Mike 
Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, revealed yesterday that in the last 
financial year recruitment had fallen 7 per cent short of the target.  
 
Yet the Commonwealth figures show that numbers have risen from 205 in 
1998 to about 6,000 this year. There are currently 5,500 Commonwealth 
and overseas soldiers serving in the UK Field Army and another 700 recruits 
are under training.  
 
Other infantry regiments with a high proportion of overseas or 
Commonwealth soldiers include: The Royal Scots with 89 (the latest figures 
relate to November last year); the 2nd Battalion The Princess of Wales’s 
Royal Regiment, 91; the 1st Battalion The Royal Green Jackets, 88; the 2nd 
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Battalion The Royal Green Jackets, 107; and the Royal Gloucestershire, 
Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment, 85. … 
 
With gaps appearing in many of the British infantry regiments, the Army 
began an intensive drive to recruit from the Commonwealth, and teams were 
sent far and wide, from the Caribbean to southern Africa, to offer careers in 
the British Army. The take-up was beyond all expectation.  
 
The influx of Fijians was particularly welcomed, not just because of their 
military prowess but also because of their reputation as excellent rugby 
players. The Army’s rugby team has benefited accordingly…  
 
Figures released four years ago showed that the top Commonwealth 
recruiting countries were Fiji, followed by South Africa, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, Zimbabwe, Jamaica and India (Evans, 2005). 
 
In the context of predictions that ‘almost one in five soldiers in the British army 
could come from Commonwealth countries by 2020’, a vigorous debate ensued in 
both press and military circles through 2007 and 2008.7 It culminated in a 
Government announcement, in February 2009, that an upper limit of 15% was to be 
placed on the foreign and Commonwealth complements of the three elements of the 
Army with the highest concentration of such personnel (the Royal Logistic Corps, the 
Royal Army Dental Corps and the Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps) 
(Hansard, 2009). 
 
Leaving aside the fact that this decision may yet be subject to legal challenge, the 
change of policy represented by the introduction of a cap on Commonwealth 
recruitment, and the concerns that it reflects, —has wider implications for British 
conceptions of nationality and citizenship which remain contested and unresolved.  
We return to this issue below. 
 
4. Differential incorporation or voluntary exclusion 
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The recruitment targets originating in SDR and subsequently periodically revised 
were justified on the basis of improved representativeness, or a socio-demographic 
match between the military and society. However, both the large numbers of non-
British minority personnel and the under-representation of South Asians raise 
questions about the extent to which, even with improved performance against the 
SDR targets, the armed forces are really more representative of British society. It 
suggests that new-found diversity is, in practice, limited in scope.   
 
There are various possible explanations for the under-representation of South Asian 
personnel. They include deliberate exclusion (discrimination) and ineffective 
recruitment efforts. It may, however, be the result of an explicit unwillingness to 
enlist. The armed services have long tended to see the barriers to improving the 
recruitment of minority ethnic personnel as lying within minority ethnic 
communities; in ignorance about the opportunities afforded by the services or in 
concern about a past racism that is now said to be being addressed. There is some 
evidence that there is an element of truth in all these explanations. But there are 
also some indications of a more general sense that the armed forces do not really 
‘belong’ to minority ethnic citizens and that this also explains the apparent 
reluctance of some groups to enlist (Hussain & Ishaq, 2002). 
 
As we have argued before, however, there are dangers in reading voluntary 
exclusion simply in cultural terms. This practice represents a particular variant of a 
tendency, in both the academic and policy literature relating to ethnic difference in 
Britain, to assume that wherever putative ethnic differences have been identified, 
ethnicity must be the principal explanatory variable (see Mason, 2003 a & b). 
 
Given the differences that are known to exist between groups in their propensity to 
select particular occupations or to aspire to particular careers, it is likely that cultural 
preferences play only a part in decisions about whether or not to join the armed 
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services.8 Focussing on them can easily provide an excuse for not addressing the 
deficiencies of existing organisational structures and practices. 
 
Closer analysis of patterns of social and occupational mobility among Britain’s 
minority ethnic citizens suggests that we should not underestimate the role of 
rational decision-making in occupational placement.   
 
The last few decades have seen marked upward mobility among members of 
some minority ethnic groups in Britain (Iganski & Payne, 1996 & 1999). As a 
result, even some of the previously most disadvantaged groups, Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis, have significantly closed the gap with whites in terms of economic 
activity, unemployment and job levels (Iganski & Payne, 2000; Mason, 2003 a & 
b). 
 
As a result, we need to place any discussion of the attractiveness to potential 
minority ethnic recruits of a career in the armed services in the context of the 
range of other opportunities open to them. Such opportunities include further and 
higher education, with the evidence indicating that members of minority ethnic 
groups are more likely to remain in full-time education after the age of 16 than 
are their white counterparts (Modood, et al., 1997; Modood & Ackland, 1998.); 
Modood & Shiner, 1994). In this context, we should note that survey evidence 
about the attitudes to military service of minorities of Pakistani Muslim descent in 
Britain revealed a tendency to prioritize further and higher education over 
enlistment in what was often seen as a low status occupation (Hussain & Ishaq, 
2002). There is a strong possibility, moreover, that these sentiments have now 
been compounded by questions surrounding the legitimacy of the armed forces’ 
missions over the past few years in Afghanistan and Iran. 
 
Any analysis of the potential attractiveness of a military career must be placed in 
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this broader context. Measured against other opportunities, it may be that a military 
career is simply not sufficiently attractive.  It is, perhaps, no coincidence that, whilst 
members of Britain’s South Asian minority ethnic groups appear reluctant to enter 
the nursing profession, there is no shortage of applicants from these same groups 
for careers as doctors (Iganski & Mason, 2002). 
 
This line of argument is also consistent with the recruitment patterns discussed 
above. It is a commonplace that labour market disadvantage has often been 
associated with increased willingness to enlist, as the old adage that unemployment 
is the best recruitment sergeant attests. (Or as a contributor at the 2006 IUS 
Canada Conference put it, ‘We recruit the best of the desperate.’) We noted above 
that British citizens classified as Black are significantly over-represented among 
indigenous minorities joining the armed forces. They are also among the groups that 
continue to experience significant labour market disadvantage. 
 
5. The challenge of increased numbers and enhanced diversity 
Notwithstanding the various caveats rehearsed above, it is clear that, for whatever 
reasons, there has been a growth in the numbers of minority personnel in the UK 
armed forces and, particularly, the army. This in turn poses its own challenges. 
Elsewhere we have argued that these challenges include the emergence of issues 
relating to retention, including advancement (the potential emergence of an 
‘armoured glass ceiling’), exclusionary occupational cultures and persistent reports 
of bullying and harassment (Dandeker & Mason, 2007). We shall not rehearse these 
issues again here. Instead, we want to suggest that a diversity that embraces not 
merely UK citizens of minority descent but also Commonwealth and foreign citizens 
highlights and exacerbates some existing uncertainties about how that diversity is to 
be understood and accommodated. Those uncertainties relate not only to the impact 
on the armed services themselves but to the way the relevant issues are framed in 
wider political and social discourse. 
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A key danger is that of conditional inclusion. Minorities have not always been 
excluded from the British armed services. Indeed, the policing and defence of 
Empire led to the recruitment of large numbers of imperial subjects to the armed 
forces. Many served Britain in both world wars. However, the Empire’s inclusion of 
such personnel was always highly conditional. They were frequently recruited to 
separate units officered by British personnel; an arrangement that continues to 
apply in the special case of the Gurkhas. Elsewhere, imperial subjects were often 
employed in low status roles in otherwise white units. The example of black cooks, 
stewards and stokers in otherwise white crewed Royal Naval vessels was a case in 
point (Smith, 2004: 60). 
 
Is it possible that the growth in the numbers of Commonwealth citizens recruited to 
the army could lead to a comparable conditional inclusion? There is currently no 
policy of recruiting Commonwealth and foreign soldiers to separate units and, 
although it is occasionally mooted, there is no evidence of such an initiative having 
acquired serious legitimacy or momentum. Nevertheless, there is some evidence 
that the growing numbers of such personnel have, hitherto at least, been 
concentrated in particular regiments (see the Times article quoted above). More 
significantly, there are at least some suggestions that these personnel feel 
particularly marginalised within the units within which they serve and experience a 
double disadvantage on the basis both of ethnicity and citizenship. Reporting on the 
setting up of the British Commonwealth Soldiers' Union, the BBC quoted its founder, 
a Belize born soldier: 
 
Commonwealth soldiers are third-class soldiers. First you have the British-
born white soldier, then the British-born black soldier, then the black 
Commonwealth soldier. In some units, white soldiers will be given priority for 
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courses over black soldiers, and the black soldier - no matter how long he's 
been in - will be put behind the white soldier (BBC News, 2007). 
 
Were such experiences to be widespread, it is not difficult to see how they could 
seriously affect both the army’s reputation among minorities (with knock-on 
consequences for future recruitment) and its operational effectiveness. If the 
armed forces are to build on the admittedly limited successes of recent 
recruitment rounds, they have to address this perception of conditional inclusion. 
This, as we have argued elsewhere, (Dandeker & Mason, 2003; 2007) involves 
rising to the fundamental challenge of embracing and delivering a diversity 
relevant to the aims of the armed forces and the state by placing it within a 
shared framework of values and expectations. Difference must be accommodated 
to the need for discipline and cohesion. 
 
This task, however, is difficult to accomplish for a military serving a society that 
itself has yet effectively to rise to the challenges posed by its recent history and 
contemporary demographic makeup. We have argued elsewhere that the heritage of 
Empire continues to weigh heavily on the British national psyche (Dandeker & 
Mason, 2007). One of its consequences is a schizophrenic attitude to the 
Commonwealth, a body both celebrated as the embodiment of the positive legacy of 
empire and experienced as a reminder of the extent to which the power once 
wielded by the ‘mother country’ has been challenged and attenuated. It is not 
implausible to see this ambivalence being reflected both in the decision to 
systematically pursue Commonwealth personnel as a solution to the military 
recruitment shortfall and as the spur to concerns that the ‘Britishness’ of the army 
might be under threat. 
 
This schizophrenia is arguably not new. It is also manifested in the history of Britain 
and its military over the last two centuries or so. As we have argued before 
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(Dandeker & Mason, 2001), the recent forebears of many of Britain's citizens who 
are not white encountered the armed forces either as enemies or colonial subjects.  
If it has been difficult to view their descendants as co-nationals because they lack 
the common origins and the ethnic homogeneity which the British national myth 
requires, how much more difficult might it be unequivocally to embrace as 
comrades-in-arms Commonwealth personnel who cannot even lay claim to formal 
citizenship? 
 
It is difficult to overstate the impact of these distinctive features of British national 
self-conceptions. They diverge significantly from those of the United States, whose 
origin myths emphasise diversity and whose official national values centre on a 
contractually devised constitution. There have, however, been other developments 
in recent years that have complicated British attempts to come to terms with a post-
colonial identity in which large numbers of former colonial subjects are now co-equal 
citizens. 
 
6. Multiculturalism and its discontents 
The policy first enunciated in the SDF was framed in terms of a conventional 
multiculturalism. This drew strongly on a famous definition of integration offered by 
the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, in 1966: 
 
I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but 
as equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of 
mutual tolerance. (Quoted in Brighton, 2007) 
 
The concept of multiculturalism has always been a contested one and there are few, 
if any, agreed definitions (see the discussion in Parekh, 2006). In its most ‘official’ 
British manifestation, however, it has tended to imply a commitment to political 
integration accompanied by incorporation on equal terms within the public sphere 
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on the basis of a set of common civic values. These values themselves are intended 
to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate limited cultural variation – such as dress 
and dietary requirements and the mutual public celebration of religious and other 
festivals – while consigning a much greater degree of culturally based difference to 
the realm of the private (Rex, 1985, especially page 6). 
 
The commitment to multiculturalism, even in this limited sense, was never fully 
accepted across the political spectrum, particularly on the radical right and left and 
in sections of some minority communities.  However, it is fair to say that until 
relatively recently it had become an elite orthodoxy, at least at a rhetorical level. In 
recent years, however, much has changed. 
 
The events of 11 September, 2001, were a key turning point, reinforcing already 
emerging concerns in some parts of the British polity that the demands of Muslim 
communities, in particular, could not be accommodated within the existing 
multicultural settlement.9 These concerns were reinforced by the events of July 
2005 when terrorist attacks were perpetrated in London by young British Muslims. 
The result was a clear re-orientation of the rhetoric of integration with the 
emergence of much more explicit that hitherto assimilationist overtones (Brighton, 
2007: 7-8). 
 
Even before the full implications of these terrorist outrages had become apparent, 
urban disorders in a number of cities in the north of England in the summer and 
autumn of 2001 had begun to ring alarm bells in government and other circles.  
Once again, the disturbances appeared to be evidence of a breakdown of the 
multicultural accommodation and, again, Muslim young men seemed to be at the 
centre of events.10 Analyses of the events produced evidence, in particular, of 
significant residential segregation, particularly of Muslim communities, with knock- 
on effects for educational provision and patterns of day to day interaction. In the 
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face of this information, many commentators, together with Government ministers, 
concluded that processes of self-segregation were at work which not only breached 
the principles of the multicultural settlement but threatened what was to become 
known as community cohesion.11 The search commenced for improved ways to 
secure the integration of Britain’s diverse ethic communities, with the emphasis 
once again particularly focussed on Muslims. The diagnoses produced focussed 
above all on two alleged causal factors: the radicalising activities of some Muslim 
clerics and the intrusion of cultural practices, properly the province of the private 
sphere, into the public realm. Recent debates, initiated by ex-Government minister 
Jack Straw, concerning the wearing of the Hijab or veil exemplify this point (BBC 
News, 2006). 
 
All of these debates implicitly, if not explicitly, involve a questioning of the nature of 
the commitment of Muslim citizens to a cohesive community and, at least 
potentially, call into question their loyalty to the nation state – with obvious 
implications for their role in the armed forces.  
 
Many of these discussions and diagnoses have fallen victim to a tendency to 
essentialise Islamic communities, ignoring national, communal and doctrinal 
differences (for example, between Turks, Bangladeshis, Gujerati Muslims and 
Pakistanis in various parts of the UK). In practice, there is no strong evidence either 
that Muslim personnel are especially victim to divided loyalties or that in other 
circumstances other groups would not experience tensions of this kind. Indeed, 
evidence from the 2001 Census suggests that the vast majority of all those 
affirming membership of a minority ethnic group also unequivocally described their 
national identity as British, English, Scottish or Welsh.  
 
This included almost nine in ten people from a Mixed (88 per cent) or Black 
Caribbean (86 per cent) group, around eight in ten people from a Pakistani 
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(83 per cent), Bangladeshi (82 per cent) or Other Black (83 per cent) group, 
and three quarters (75 per cent) of the Indian group (National Statistics, 
2006). 
 
Yet the persistence of speculation about this issue, taken together with a popular 
tendency, in Britain at least, to demonise all Muslims as potentially fundamentalists 
or terrorists has clear consequences for attempts to re-imagine Britain in the 21st 
Century (Dandeker & Mason, 2003). In a military context, of course, such persistent 
speculation has clear potential implications for the experience of Muslim recruits and 
hence for the ability to meet recruitment targets. To the extent that these wider 
political and social debates are replicated among service personnel, as surely they 
must be, they also have the potential to threaten unit cohesion, the goal of which is, 
of course, the tested solution to problems of loyalty, commitment and, crucially, 
military effectiveness. 
 
The rethinking of the multicultural settlement does not, however, depend solely on 
the rise of concerns about segregated and radicalised Muslim communities. It also 
reflects a wider set of debates about immigration. These debates have been 
reinvigorated both by the increases in the numbers of asylum seekers and political 
refugees arriving in Britain in the last decade and by increases in immigration from 
the new EU states of eastern Europe. The message of those increasingly questioning 
old-style multiculturalism is that it has emphasised and promoted difference and 
separation (sometimes represented as a kind of ‘tribalism’) at the expense of 
mutual trust, tolerance and a sense of a wider, shared community of belonging.12 
 
One response has been a renewed emphasis on the importance of integration 
conceived more narrowly than in the multicultural version. This has included the 
development of citizenship education classes and new tests of language and civic 
competence for those seeking British Citizenship by naturalization. Once again, the 
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emphasis is on a conception of ‘integration’ that goes beyond the tolerance of 
cultural difference towards a distinctly more assimilationist model.  This is not one 
that primarily emphasises acculturation but rather one with a clear focus on 
commitment to shared and renewed civic values. 
  
It is not difficult to see the changes of policy towards the recruitment of 
Commonwealth troops as part of this wider process of rethinking the national and 
citizenship project. 
 
This rethinking requires the squaring of more than one circle. How does Britain 
come to terms with its post-imperial status while maintaining a commitment to an 
international diplomatic and expeditionary military role? How can its hitherto 
strongly ethnicist conception of nationality be reconciled with a world in which large 
scale migration and settlement is both a fact of life and the sine qua non of 
economic success? And how can existing citizenship rules, framed largely in terms of 
an earlier debate about immigration and a primordialist view of nationality, be 
accommodated to what looks increasingly like an emerging contractual, civic 
conception of citizenship – if one that is yet to be fully and clearly articulated?     
 
The growing challenge to multiculturalism – itself contested and frequently 
contradictory – has yet to result in a clear alternative vision. At best we can discern 
tentative movements towards a more integrationist vision, marked by a flirtation 
with a civic, contractual model of citizenship yet unwilling to abandon entirely a 
sense of nationhood rooted in a primordialist view of history. Whether a resolution is 
either imminent or possible must remain a matter of speculation, as must the 
question of whether it will be driven by principle or by a frequently underestimated 
British capacity for pragmatism. 
 
7. Conclusion 
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In an earlier paper, we concluded as follows: 
 
The Armed Services are the servants and representatives of a wider society, 
doing its bidding, reflecting its traditions and defending its values. But this 
raises the question of what it is they are to be representative (or reflective) 
of. The challenge of securing the inclusion of minority ethnic citizens – of 
creating the conditions in which diversity can be valued in all aspects of 
social life – is a national one, not just a task for the armed forces. In Britain, 
this entails nothing less than completing the task of re-imagining the nation 
in the 21st Century (Dandeker & Mason, 2007: 151). 
 
We see no reason to revise this view, although the circumstances in which that re-
imagining is to take place have dramatically changed. Whilst it is right and proper 
that we demand of the Armed Services that they continue to seek more fully to 
represent the nation they serve, it will only be when that nation has a clearer view 
of its desired shape and direction that the task can be fully accomplished.  
                                           
Notes 
 
1 Note that the population figure in this statement has been superseded by the results of the 2001 
Census, which shows that some 9% of the population of England affirmed minority ethnic group 
membership. The target for minority ethnic recruitment has also been raised from an initial aim of 6% 
by 2006 to 8% by 2013 (Ministry of Defence, nd). 
2 There is evidence that recruitment and retention levels have improved in the last twelve months. 
This improvement is attributed by Government sources to initiatives to improve pay and conditions 
(Ministry of Defence, 2009). Others have suggested that recruits have been attracted by the 
challenges of current operations and the honours that have been conferred on those who have served 
with distinction. It is also possible that the recession has had some effect. We are not currently in a 
position to evaluate the evidence for these different possible explanations. In any event, it would be 
unwise, at this early stage, to base a revamp of policy on what may turn out to be a short-term 
improvement. 
3 Data from 2002/03 onwards are taken from Ministry of Defence, 2007. Earlier data were compiled 
from DASA sources for earlier publications by the authors. A recoding exercise, to reflect revised 
Census categories, means that no ethnicity data are available for 2001/02. Note also that army data 
for 2006/07 are described by DASA as provisional owing to the ongoing validation of data from a new 
personnel administration system. 
4 It would be unwise to draw conclusions at this stage from incomplete and provisional 2006/07 data. 
Po
t-Pr
21 
 
                                                                                                                         
5 It is also possible, of course, that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may have had a depressive effect 
on the recruitment of minority personnel. 
6 Research has demonstrated patterns of this kind in the nursing workforce, for example (Iganski & 
Mason, 2002). 
7See, for example, Norton-Taylor (2008); The Times of India (2008). 
8 We know, for example, that most ‘whites’ do not enlist and that those who do tend to be drawn from 
highly traditional and geographically discrete recruitment pools. See Dandeker & Strachan, 1993 and 
Strachan, 2002.  
9  The Salman Rushdie affair was an earlier case in point.  See the discussion in Brighton, 2007. 
10  See the discussions in Mason, 2003c. 
11  In fact, there was little convincing evidence that residential segregation was self-imposed and 
many indications that it resulted from the operation of the local housing markets. See Harrison, 2003 
and Finney & Simpson, 2009. 
12  For a flavour of the debates that have emerged in recent years, see Phillip, 2004; Jasper, 2005;  
BBC News, 2005; BBC News, 2008.  For an assessment of some of the more alarmist contributions, 
see Finney & Simpson, 2009. 
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